



## Innocent or Holy? Justification and Sanctification in Old Testament Theology

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### I. JUSTIFICATION AND SANCTIFICATION AS THEOLOGICAL LOCI

The debate over the proper relationship between justification and sanctification seldom has taken into account the underlying conceptual framework of the Old Testament<sup>1</sup>; as a result, the two are often juxtaposed in unhelpful ways. Within Lutheran and Reformed theology there has been a natural tendency to concentrate so intensely on justification that matters relating to sanctification, such as the question of the third use of the law, have been particularly difficult. Sanctification has often been understood as the progress the be-

<sup>1</sup>Returning *ad fontes* has often meant rooting one's theology in Luther or at most in Paul and the sayings of Jesus, as though whatever they drew from the Old Testament must simply have been overcome or at least superseded in the history of revelation; e.g., Carl Braaten and Robert Jenson, *Christian Dogmatics*, vol. 2 (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984) 430. Consider the cautionary remarks regarding the inheritance and transmission of a normative and authoritative canon made by Brevard S. Childs, *Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments: Theological Reflection on the Christian Bible* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992) 70-71.

liever makes under the law as a response to God's imputation of justifying grace. As such, it has rightly been rejected as undermining the exclusive action of God in Christ, having no rightful place within the loci of confessional theology. Such a take-no-prisoners position, however, naturally inspires opponents to insist that sanctification *is* an essential locus of biblical theology and that it has a necessary role in the life of faith.

How the role of sanctification is linked to the role of justification has been the crux of the problem; their relationship has generally been understood as sequential and positional—justification relating to God's objective and initial action of freeing from the power of sin and death, and sanctification representing the subjective aspects of the subsequent holy life that is lived out under God's grace. Classical positions have generally been careful to insist that sanctification is itself a bestowal of grace, no less than justification. It is clear, however, that lining the two up as cause and effect or as an initial action solely performed by God and a subsequent action that God shares with "man already justified"<sup>2</sup> has been a source of anxiety; such attempts have not lessened the trauma of trying to maintain the place of sanctification as a locus without undermining the fundamental importance of justification.

Karl Barth attempted to resolve the tension by regarding justification and sanctification as two "sides," "directions," "forms," or "aspects" of one event of divine grace and by locating them under discrete loci: justification as the right of God established in the humiliation and death

of Jesus Christ, who is the “obedient Son of God”<sup>3</sup>; sanctification as the “exaltation of man” from his sloth and misery as participation in the exaltation of the “Son of Man.”<sup>4</sup> Even with such a rethinking of basic categories—associating justification with the obedience of the Son of God and sanctification with the exaltation of the Son of Man—and in spite of his insistence that the two are not successive states,<sup>5</sup> Barth still spoke of sanctification in some sense as logically resting “wholly and utterly on...justification before God.”<sup>6</sup> And though he refers to the two as in every sense a *symmetria*, it is one in which one side of the symmetry—that expressive of the righteousness of God—“calls for” a symmetrical actualization “in the obedience of the believer” or a confirmation “of our adoption to divine sonship.”<sup>7</sup> The recent treatment by Braaten and Jenson similarly aimed at undermining any false separation between a cause and its effect, doing so by stressing the “dynamic unity” of justification and sanctification within the context of an eschatological perspective that relativizes chronology.<sup>8</sup> Nevertheless, they still speak of their relationship in terms of “justifi-

<sup>2</sup>The classical statement of Heinrich Schmid, *The Doctrinal Theology of the Evangelical Lutheran Church*, 3rd revised ed. (1899; reprint, Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1961) 488.

<sup>3</sup>Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, vol. 4, part 1 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1958) 128-54.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, 4/2, 499-510.

<sup>5</sup>This is true because there is no *spatium temporis* between the two; *Church Dogmatics* 4/2, 506.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, 499.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, 506.

<sup>8</sup>They speak of their “dynamic unity in the light of the eschatological nature of the divine action”; *Christian Dogmatics*, 430. Note the focus upon an eschatological perspective, p. 435.

cation exploding into love and good works”<sup>9</sup> or of sanctification being “what happens when the unconditional and eschatological event of justification breaks into one’s life.”<sup>10</sup>

So long as justification and sanctification are juxtaposed in this manner, there will be little opportunity for resolution of questions related to leading a life holy and acceptable to God. Some will continue to be suspicious of “good works” as untrustworthy indicators of divine grace while others will insist upon them as necessary signs of the efficaciousness of such grace. “Holy living” will continue to be either dismissed as an irrelevant preoccupation with human achievement or sought out as the personal assurance of God’s gift truly at work. It may be, however, that a sequential juxtaposition of the two—whether temporal or logical—or one that links them together as act and response or as cause and effect, is itself the chief problem for our conception of their relationship. The biblical witness may suggest another possibility.

## II. SIN AND HUMAN BROKENNESS IN THE OLD TESTAMENT

The Old Testament is fully cognizant of the pervasiveness of human brokenness, deeply entrenched in the human condition (Ps 51:5). No one can claim to live free of iniquity, and if God were to keep a ledger sheet for sin no one would pass the audit (Ps 130:3). Neither the power nor the tragic nature of sin is minimized in the least (Ps 38:1-8; 40:12); sin is in fact taken so seriously that considerable anxiety exists even over those transgressions that are “unintended” (בְּשִׁגְגָה) or “hidden” (בְּעֵלָם מְזִמָּה).<sup>11</sup> The popular assumption that “sin” relates simply to the willful commission of acts that are opposed to the divine will represents nothing less than a trivializing of the biblical concept. The Old Testament, congruent with the biblical witness in

general, does not limit human sin to such human willfulness, but rather understands sin fundamentally as an amoral state or condition that can exist quite apart from human intentionality. For this reason, not only are certain unknown or unintended acts understood to be expressive of human sin; more to our chagrin and confusion, certain states or conditions are equally thought to manifest sin, particularly conditions relating to matters of purity and wholeness. Our initial reaction to such a notion is to sniff self-righteously at the very thought that sin might go beyond the moral aspects of human intention. In so doing, however, it is we who trivialize the notion of sin and brokenness, the power of which is fully respected in the faith attested in the Old Testament.

Given this fundamental awareness of the ubiquitous and pervasive presence of human sin, the ease with which the psalmists can speak of their innocence and blamelessness before God (e.g., Ps 18:20-24) seems shockingly presumptuous and

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.,434.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.,437.

<sup>11</sup>For a review of the matter, see Robin C. Cover, "Sin, Sinners (OT)," in *The Anchor Bible Dictionary* 6:34-35. Cf. Rolf Knierim, *Die Hauptbegriffe für Sünde im Alten Testament* (Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1965). On the comparative data, see K. van der Toom, *Sin and Sanction in Israel and Mesopotamia: A Comparative Study* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1985) 94-99.

nearly blasphemous. The penitential psalms certainly have priority of place in the piety of Christian liturgical tradition. The simple fact is, however, that they are far outnumbered by psalms in which the suppliant protests purity of heart and faithfulness of commitment in the face of what he or she considers to be the scandal of divine inattentiveness or slackness.<sup>12</sup> Invitations offered by the psalmist for God to "search me and know my heart," confident that "there is [no] wicked way in me" (Ps 139:23-24; 26:1-2), or to "hear a just cause...from lips free of deceit" (Ps 17:1) grate painfully on our ears and make little sense given the larger framework in which human sin is understood.

Such dissonance is created for us by the fact that "righteousness" is understood in the Old Testament as a relative rather than absolute term. Consider, for example, the "entrance liturgy" of Psalm 15, where the righteous life is reduced to the most generalized principles: walking blamelessly, doing what is right, speaking the truth from one's heart, not slandering, doing no evil to friends, taking no reproach against neighbor, despising the wicked, honoring those who fear God, standing by oaths, not lending money at interest, taking no bribe. This list can hardly serve as a detailed inventory against which one can measure behavior with any degree of precision! Even more characteristic is the similar list in Psalm 24. The righteous are those who "have clean hands and pure hearts, do not lift their souls to what is false, and do not swear deceitfully." Samuel's protestation of innocence (1 Sam 12:3-5) strikes us as being a very inadequate summation of an entire life of righteousness: "Whose ox have I taken? Or whose donkey have I taken? Or whom have I defrauded? Whom have I oppressed? Or from whose hand have I taken a bribe?" Given the pervasive view of sin, such lists seem like tragic and desperate attempts to plug the crumbling dike of human brokenness. The precision of our logic demands that righteousness be all or nothing, and, as for me, I certainly hope that my epitaph will read more than "He didn't take anybody's donkey." It is difficult to conceive of righteousness in

relative terms. Nevertheless, biblical faith is not afraid to do just that. Doing so, however, did not undermine the Old Testament's first and fundamental truth regarding the profoundly pervasive nature of sin.

### III. "SANCTIFICATION" IN DEUTERONOMISTIC THEOLOGY

Protestations of (relative) righteousness were not limited to individuals in distress, but could also be found on the lips of the corporate community as it protested God's rejection and abasement in the face of its own fidelity to the covenant (e.g., Ps 44:8-26). In time of national catastrophe, however, protesting the community's righteousness was not the only response, or even the primary response, to potentially disconfirming experiences. The shocking disconfirmation experienced in the destruction of Judah and Jerusalem and in the community's exile to Babylon undoubtedly resulted in a thoroughgoing reorientation of Israel's

<sup>12</sup>On the theodical aspects of such prayers see Samuel E. Balentine, *Prayer in the Hebrew Bible: The Drama of Divine-Human Dialogue* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993) 139-98.

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theology. One primary voice of reorientation was that of the deuteronomistic school, which saw in the destruction of 587/86 B.C.E. not evidence of divine malfeasance or inattentiveness but rather of corporate collusion to break the covenant relationship with God.<sup>13</sup> In general terms, the deuteronomistic historian (DtrH) lays the responsibility for the crisis of exile squarely on the heads of the corporate community itself.<sup>14</sup> In a more focused perspective, however, it is the king and the royal bureaucracy who are fingered particularly,<sup>15</sup> and it is this narrower perspective of the deuteronomistic (dtr) program that seems to have found its way into the related prophetic critique.<sup>16</sup>

The deuteronomistic conception of Israel's brokenness was shaped by two fundamental principles. First, Israel was chosen by God as a special possession, set apart—to use cultic language—as a “holy possession” to God (Deut 7:6; 14:2, 21; 26:19; 28:9). Israel's holiness, according to this perspective, was an *a priori* status assigned to it by God at the initiation of the relationship. This dtr conviction is apparent, for example, in Jeremiah's view that Israel was “holy to the Lord,” God's first fruits, all becoming guilty who dared to eat of her (Jer 2:3). This language was drawn directly from Israel's cultic terminology concerning sanctuary revenue, which was declared to be “most holy” and therefore reserved for priestly consumption. Anyone else eating of it would incur precisely the type of guilt (אָשָׁם) which Jer 2:3 suggests was contracted by the nations. For the deuteronomistic school, holiness was a fundamental and indelible character of Israel's status, according to which it was set apart from normal consumption (קָדָשׁ קִדְשֵׁי־יְהוָה) and reserved for the realm of the holy (קִדְוֹשׁ). Israel was set apart (i.e., “sanctified,” קִדְשׁ) and belonged wholly to God. This was Israel's non-negotiable status.

The basis for this divine selection resided in no quality recognizably present in Israel itself. Deuteronomistic language is clear: Israel's selection came *in spite* of itself. They were the fewest and the least of all people. And it certainly had nothing to do with a positive righteousness already present. The most that could be said is that Israel was what was left over after God rejected the indigenous Canaanites because of their even more astounding wickedness. God had bound himself to a promise made to Israel's ancestors (Deut 7:7-8), and any relationship with Israel was due solely to divine integrity in commitment to this promise, in spite of the people's

essential nature (Deut 9:4-6). They were set apart as holy in spite of what they were like!

<sup>13</sup>That disconfirming experiences lead to solutions based upon the assumption of corporate guilt rather than divine malfeasance is not a novelty peculiar to Israel's (or biblical) piety, but was common throughout the ancient near east. Cf. the theodical proposal engraved in the Mesha Stele, which blamed Moab's national catastrophe not on Chemosh's inattentiveness or malfeasance but upon popular disobedience leading to Chemosh's being "angry at his land." *Ancient Near Eastern Texts* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1950) 320.

<sup>14</sup>2 Kgs 17:7-18.

<sup>15</sup>On the role ascribed by DtrH to Jeroboam I, cf. 2 Kgs 16:21-23. On the role ascribed to Manasseh, cf. 2 Kgs 21:1-9, 16; 23:26-27.

<sup>16</sup>E.g., Jeremiah's critique particularly of Jehoiakim and "the shepherds who destroy and scatter the sheep of my pasture" in Jeremiah 21-23.

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The second principle characterizing the dtr concept of justification is this: as a corollary to Israel's *a priori* status, it was called upon to exhibit a life of obedience to God's covenant. "You *are* holy. Therefore *be* obedient." This distinction between holiness and obedience is crucial. Holiness did not lead inexorably to Israel's obedience. In fact, the opposite was true. Still, according to the dtr perspective, such obedience to the covenant was fundamentally possible. Israel's call to keep the Torah was a call to "choose life rather than death," and such a calling—according to the deuteronomist—was well within human capabilities. The covenant, stipulations to which Israel bound itself were not unreasonable expectations. They were not "in heaven" or "across the seas," so that keeping them would require acts of super-human strength. Rather they were immediately available to the covenant people, "in their heart," as it were (Deut 30:11-14).<sup>17</sup>

Certainly, the DtrH—writing from the ash heap of Jerusalem's destruction—knew how the story was going to turn out. He knew that Israel and its king would fail miserably. Indeed, knowing how the story would end led the DtrH to project the ending from the beginning. Israel's failure and God's judgment were presupposed from the very moment that the covenant was made: "You cannot serve the Lord..." (Josh 24:19).<sup>18</sup> Knowing the end of the story, however, did not lead the DtrH to regard the covenant stipulations, the life of obedience, as itself an impossible burden. Rather, he saw in the destruction of 587/86 B.C.E. a sign of unexplainable and irrational human failure<sup>19</sup> in the context of what ought to have been an eminently doable expectation: "You are holy. Therefore be obedient."

#### IV. "SANCTIFICATION" IN PRIESTLY THEOLOGY

The dtr tradition understood Israel's "sanctification" as the *a priori* status of its being set apart for relationship with God to be lived out in a life of obedience and righteousness. The other major theological voice in the Old Testament—the priestly tradition (P)—reversed this relationship. For P, holiness was not a status granted to Israel from the beginning. Rather, it was itself the status to *which Israel was called*, a calling based solely upon God's own holiness. P's often repeated refrain is the admonition for Israel to "be holy as I am holy."<sup>20</sup> Israel's charge to be "a holy nation"<sup>21</sup> removes sanctification from a non-negotiable status and instead establishes it as the quality of life to which Israel is called in obedience. In the

<sup>17</sup>The notion that the Torah is "in your heart" is thus basic to the dtr understanding of life in grace. When

Jer 31:34 restates this principle, it does not reflect a novum in the tradition. What is new in Jeremiah's covenant has nothing to do with its being located in the believer's heart but rather with its innate character—due solely to divine grace in forgiveness—which will mitigate the necessity to “teach it” to one's children.

<sup>18</sup>On matters relating to DtrH, see the classical essay by Hans Walter Wolff, “The Kerygma of the Deuteronomistic Historical Work,” in *The Vitality of Old Testament Traditions*, ed. W. Brueggemann (Atlanta: John Knox, 1975) 83-100.

<sup>19</sup>The “unnatural” behavior of Israel is best illustrated by the message of Jeremiah, itself steeped in the dtr tradition (Jer 2:10-11, 32; 8:4-5, 7; 18:14-15).

<sup>20</sup>Lev 11:44-45; 19:2; 20:7, 26.

<sup>21</sup>Exod 19:6.

priestly tradition, there is no presumption of primal holiness. There is only a charge to *be* holy.

Furthermore, in the priestly tradition there is a shift away from the relational aspects of covenant so clearly evident in the dtr program. Instead, the priestly program focuses upon the physical aspects of life in covenant with God. Israel's disobedience leads not primarily to a *moral* revulsion on God's part but rather leads to the contamination of the land and the sanctuary and thus to a *physical* revulsion that threatens to drive God in disgust from the land.<sup>22</sup> It is this physical aspect of clean and unclean, pure and defiled, that lies behind the priestly concern for Israel's holiness, since holiness is itself most vulnerable to such contamination. Certainly Israel is called to obedience and to the righteous life. However, such obedience is for the sake of the purity of the camp, lest it become contaminated and God depart in disgust. There is, then, a major metaphorical shift between the deuteronomistic and the priestly programs. For the priestly tradition, Israel is not “God's holy portion.” Rather Israel lives in the presence of God's own holiness, and therefore is called to protect the integrity of the camp in holy living.

More significant yet is the fundamental shift in understanding the possibility of Israel's obedience. In the deuteronomistic program, there was a strong contractual understanding of covenant. Israel was to keep the covenant stipulations—themselves eminently doable—and her failure to keep them was regarded as an irrational, inexplicable, and unnatural failure of nerve. Israel *began* holy and forfeited the status because of this unprecedented and astonishing failure. For the priestly tradition, however, there is no primal status of holiness against which the failure would become all the more scandalous. In fact—and this is the crucial matter—for p there is *only* disobedience. From the very beginning of the relationship, Israel is in a severe state of apostasy. Ezekiel 20 clearly lays out the priestly viewpoint. “On the day when I chose Israel...making myself known to them in the land of Egypt....On that day...they rebelled against me” (Ezek 20:5-8). The allusion here is to Exod 6:2-9, the classical locus of priestly theology in which God fully and *for the first time* (for P) reveals the divine identity in the name YHWH. This is God's “making the divine self known” in Egypt to which Ezek 20:5 refers. But such a divine revelation does not convey any status, holy or otherwise; nor does it result in initial obedience, as is the case in the deuteronomistic program. Instead it yields immediately to popular rejection and apostasy. Israel was *never* obedient in this priestly understanding. Nor did it ever have the capacity for such obedience. In fact, the priestly program could even admit, as Ezekiel certainly does, that God himself insured Israel's failure by sabotaging it with “statutes that were not good and ordinances by which they could not live” (Ezek 20:25).

It is because of the radical awareness of Israel's incapacity that the priestly program formulates an equally radical solution to the dilemma. For p (and unlike

<sup>22</sup>This is best articulated in Ezek 8:6, accounting for God's abandonment of the temple and city in 10:18 and 11:23. This is not to suggest, however, that priestly theology is concerned with purity at the expense of ethics, as is suggested, e.g., by John G. Gammie, *Holiness in Israel* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989) 43, 100.

dtr) Israel cannot effect its own future with faithful obedience to the stipulations of the covenant. This is why for P the central cultic icon is not the ark of the covenant, complete with decalogue deposited within—that was the icon central to the dtr schema, symbolizing the contractual relationship between God and people. But for P, obedience to covenant stipulations is not possible for Israel. Instead, the central icon for the priestly tradition is the “ark of the testimony,” which, as the footstool of God, contains Aaron's rod as the symbol of priestly mediation of the divine presence, of God's own holiness.<sup>23</sup>

Most important, in view of Israel's fundamental incapacity to effect its relationship with God, the priestly program removes the element of human initiative and focuses instead upon the eternal nature of God's covenant with Israel. It is for this reason that the covenant in the tradition is read back *through* Abraham in Genesis 17 to Noah in Genesis 9, which itself becomes a reflex of the priestly account of creation in Genesis 1.<sup>24</sup> In this way, God's covenant with Israel is only a manifestation of God's cosmic covenant with all of creation that existed from eternity and will last unto eternity. God's eternal commitment to this covenant is not predicated upon Israel's obedience—a moot question for P—but rather upon God's concern for the integrity of the divine name itself. “Not for your sake, but for the sake of my holy name which you have profaned....” This commitment represents the priestly program's radical solution to a radical problem.

## V. TWO METAPHORICAL FRAMEWORKS: HISTORY AND COSMOS

For the dtr program, holiness (sanctification) is an initial status which can only be preserved by obedience in a relationship marked by a contractual or legal conceptuality (justification). In this metaphorical view, sanctification precedes justification. For the priestly program, holiness is an attribute of God alone. Israel is marked by a radical incapacity that contaminates and drives away God's holiness.<sup>25</sup> But the solution is conceived of as an eternal covenant which exists with all creation from the very beginning. In this sense, the contractual/legal conceptuality (justification) precedes Israel's possibility of living faithfully under God's call to holiness (sanctification). Justification precedes and provides the appropriate context for sanctification.

The dtr and priestly programs invert the relationship of justification and sanctification because of their primary orientation to history on the one hand and to nature on the other. For dtr, history is the arena where God's drama is realized. Because of the *a priori* premise, that Israel is holy, the drama lies with Israel and the way it will live out such holiness in the legal/contractual context of its history.

<sup>23</sup>This is perhaps why the priestly tradition limits language concerning election to the election of the priesthood, not regarding election of nation and monarchy as significant moments. Horst Dietrich Preuss, *Old Testament Theology*, vol. 1 (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1995) 34.

<sup>24</sup>Compare the language of Gen 9:1-17 with that of Gen 1:1-31.

<sup>25</sup>In my estimation, therefore, Gammie seems to have overgeneralized when he says that “holiness in Israel was not first and foremost something for human beings to achieve, but rather that characteristic of ineffability possessed only by God.” Gammie, *Holiness in Israel*, 195. His is an accurate summary of the priestly tradition, but

“Justification” is the symbolic term for how Israel experiences the restoration of history’s broken sequentiality, a sequentiality fractured by the human sinfulness that leads to exile. For the priestly program, however, cosmos or nature is the arena where the divine drama is enacted. Because of P’s premise that God alone is holy, the drama lies with God and the way God prefaces Israel’s call to holiness with a legal/contractual arrangement that is cosmic in scope. Nature is fractured by the intrusion of chaos into its order. Because in P justice and righteousness are themselves embedded in the orderliness of cosmos,<sup>26</sup> the intrusion of chaos threatens their essential coherence. Human incapacity, however, precludes a legal/contractual solution to a problem that is fundamentally cosmic in scope. The restoration of cosmic order, the repair required by the intrusion of chaos into the justice and righteousness of the universe, is symbolized by the term “sanctification.” Sanctification symbolizes the restoration of the just order of cosmos as a response to God’s own holiness. Justification symbolizes the restoration of the sequential order of history as a response to Israel’s own holiness.

The dtr and priestly views of reality are not mutually exclusive or contradictory. They represent two different vantage points from which to survey the horizon of God’s grace. Maintaining the integrity (i.e., holiness) of the cosmos and restoring the integrity (i.e., justice) of history are corollaries. An illustration of the balance can be seen in the ritual of the atonement sacrifice in Israel’s cultic practice. Some take the benefit of the blood ritual to relate exclusively to the sanctifying of the temple furniture, which, by such action, is purged of contamination.<sup>27</sup> Cosmos is restored to order. But what about the other side of the equation? Did the atonement ritual have any justifying benefit on behalf of the sinfulness of the one presenting it? Was the atonement ritual directed only to decontamination, the restoration of the brokenness of the orderliness of cosmos (chaos)? Or did it also effect expiation, the repair of the brokenness of the sequentiality of history (sin)? In their recent studies on the matter, Neusner and Kiuchi have both argued forcefully that the two are not to be separated, since “impurity” is a ritualized way of conceiving of “sin.”<sup>28</sup> The atoning action was performed upon the object to be purged of chaos on behalf of the person to be forgiven sin. Purification (sanctification) and expiation (justification) were not mutually exclusive antitheses nor were they to be lined up in a sequential fashion as though one depended upon the prior existence of the other or followed logically from it as cause and effect.

<sup>26</sup>Hans Heinrich Schmid, *Gerechtigkeit als Weltordnung: Hintergrund und Geschichte des alttestamentlichen Gerechtigkeitsbegriffes* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1968) 166-182.

<sup>27</sup>E.g., Baruch A. Levine, *In the Presence of the Lord: A Study of Cult and Some Cultic Terms in Ancient Israel* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974) 69-74; Jacob Milgrom, *Studies in Cultic Theology and Terminology* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1983) 75-84, 237-39.

<sup>28</sup>Jacob Neusner, *The Idea of Purity in Ancient Judaism* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973) 21-25, 113; N. Kiuchi, *The Purification Offering in the Priestly Literature: Its Meaning and Function* (Sheffield: JSOT, 1987) 38-40, 65, 109. Cf. Rodney R. Hutton, *Charisma and Authority in Israelite Society* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1994) 157-60.



## VI. CONCLUSION

As human beings, our drama is played out in the realms of both history and cosmos (or nature). We are equally creatures of both realms. Likewise, we experience the brokenness of both. In Israel's own theological terms, the expression "justification" relates to the experience, shaped conceptually by a legal/judicial framework most clearly articulated in the dtr program, wherein human sin brought about the disruption of history's sequentiality, leading to exile. Justification was the code-word that symbolized the restoration and repair of history and the end of exile, repatriation to one's *place in time*. The term "sanctification" related to the experience, shaped conceptually by a cultic/ritualistic framework most clearly articulated in the priestly program, wherein the orderliness of our world was wrested at great risk from the power of chaos (though the power of chaos still poses an eternal threat to this orderliness). Sanctification was the code-word that symbolized the experience of restoration and repair of the cosmos and nature, repatriation to one's *place in space*.

Just as we are located in both time and space, in both history and nature, we have the experience of both justification and sanctification, of being made both innocent and holy. If this is an adequate perspective of the biblical understanding of these terms, then any attempt to align them in ways unintended by the biblical witness becomes problematic. Sanctification cannot be regarded as posterior to justification—whether chronologically or logically—in the manner commonly articulated, since doing so does not give adequate consideration to the dtr program which in fact reverses the sequence.

Similarly, the common notion that believers are "at the same time saint and sinner" runs the risk of confusing the terms sanctification and justification as though they were simply interchangeable. Any attempt to regard the two as a "dynamic unity" runs the risk of confusing the metaphorical realities underlying the terms. The term "saint" is not an adequate antonym for the term "sinner," since the latter reflects the context of historical rupture whereas the former reflects the context of cosmic/natural (dis)order. The only appropriate corollary to the term "sinner" as used above is "justified" (thus, *simul justus et peccator*). The expression *simul sanctus et peccator* would, from a biblical perspective, be not only unintelligible but utterly scandalous, since sin by definition offends and contaminates holiness. Thus the terms "justification" and "sanctification" have their own appropriate metaphorical significations and contexts; they ought not be confused, taken as synonyms for one another, or aligned as though one is a reflex of the other.