
Edward Erickson’s book is important reading for anyone interested in Solzhenitzyn. Although he has no knowledge of the Russian language and has had to depend on translations, some better than others, for his view of Solzhenitsyn’s works, Erickson has accomplished in his book something that I have not seen even attempted by those specializing in Russian literature: He has traced the profoundly Christian message of Solzhenitzyn from his earliest prose poems, through his major novels, to his most recent lectures and essays. Through the extensive use of quotations from all of Solzhenitzyn’s significant writings (with the exception of The Oak and the Calf, which had not been translated into English at the time of writing) and the selective analysis of characters and details from the works, Erickson has demonstrated the continuity of Solzhenitzyn’s Christian vision and moral mission throughout his career as a writer. In a word, Erickson has dealt with the essence of Solzhenitzyn, the man and the artist. As Erickson correctly points out, Solzhenitzyn “is clearly a man driven by a mission and has a vision of life which permeates all of his writing” (2).

Erickson begins his book with a detailed analysis of Solzhenitzyn’s Nobel Lecture, written in 1970. In this writing Solzhenitzyn speaks of the high mission of art and artists in the world and, as Erickson contends, grounds art “in the objective reality of God’s created order, not in an individual’s subjectivity” (7). Erickson shows Solzhenitzyn’s acute awareness of the miracle of his position. Solzhenitzyn was, after all, spared while millions of others perished. He survived the front lines of World War II, the hardships of Soviet labor camps, and the terror of cancer; yet as a survivor, he did not retreat to lick his wounds but emerged from his trials and suffering to assume his religious responsibility to God and society.

In his treatment of Solzhenitsyn’s major novels, i.e., One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, The First Circle, Cancer Ward, and August 1914, to each of which he devotes separate chapters, Erickson focuses attention on both the author’s themes and his technique of characterization. Since Solzhenitzyn, like Dostoevsky, chose character as the “central formal fictional element” (57) of his novels and attempted, also like Dostoevsky, to give each of his characters his own distinctive voice and ideas, it is not surprising that Erickson concentrated his efforts in this direction. Although he deals extensively with major figures in each of the respective works, such as Ivan Denisovich, Gleb Nerzhin, Oleg Kostoglotov, and General Sampsonov, Erickson does not neglect the pivotal role played by less conspicuous characters such as Alyosha the Baptist in One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, and Aunt Styofa and the Kadims in Cancer Ward. (Unfortunately, Erickson neglected to recognize the equally significant role of Volodin’s mother in The First Circle). In all of the characters he deals with, Erickson seeks Solzhenitzyn’s moral judgment: Who demonstrates spiritual superiority and why? In his search for the key to characters, Erickson constantly poses the question that he feels is
most important to Solzhenitzyn: “How do they fare as inhabitants of a moral universe? How far to one side or the other and in what particulars, have they pushed the line dividing good and evil which runs through every heart?” (70).

Despite its many merits, Erickson’s book is marred by occasional disturbing factual errors. Nemov in the play Love Girl and the Innocent, for example, was not killed by a falling piece of coal (45) but a falling piece of iron; and Vera Gangart in Cancer Ward was not a widow (104) but had never married. With the second er-
ror, Erickson does suffer a certain loss of credibility in his interpretation of Vera’s role in the novel.

I feel that this book is nevertheless of great significance, and nowhere is this more evident than in Erickson’s treatment of Solzhenitzyn’s The Gulag Archipelago and some of his polemical writings, such as the commencement address at Harvard University, Letter to the Soviet Leaders, and his essays in From Under the Rubble.

Erickson feels that Americans have been inclined more to talk about The Gulag Archipelago than read it and tries to convince his readers to undertake this important task, because he claims “that no other work in the annals of world literature has had such a profound immediate effect as The Gulag Archipelago” (147). In the three volumes of The Gulag Archipelago, Solzhenitzyn has created a symbol for modern man’s inhumanity against man that rivals that of the Holocaust, and cries out for the world to recognize the true history of the Soviet Union and not the one perpetuated by Soviet historians. Yet, in The Gulag Archipelago, as elsewhere, Solzhenitzyn has not written simply a political exposé of the Soviet state. His attacks on the Soviet system, says Erickson, “are never for political, but always for moral, malfeasance” (160). Solzhenitzyn’s moral vision permeates this massive work, and so does, says Erickson, the long-suffering road of Solzhenitzyn’s own development as a person, for as Solzhenitzyn himself admits, growth comes through suffering; and it is only in this manner that pride which grows in the human heart like lard on a pig (vol. I, 163) can be eliminated and people can eventually become human beings.

Solzhenitzyn’s polemical writings of the past decade have evoked many inaccurate comments and much unjust criticism from Western journalists. Among Erickson’s major achievements in this book has been to point out errors in statements made about the author and to attempt to clarify Solzhenitzyn’s position as a Christian and a Russian. “He is a Christian,” says Erickson, “but he is also a member of the world community and more immediately, a member of the Russian community. His commitment to Christian beliefs allows him no divorce between Christianity and human culture” (212). One can only hope that some of those who have published distorted views of Solzhenitzyn’s ideas and goals will read Erickson’s book and reconsider their stands.

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The bitter warfare between science and religion occasioned by Darwin’s theory of evolution in the nineteenth century has been followed by a long, unstable truce, during which scientists and theologians have generally tried to stay out of each other’s range. Since creationists seem determined to revive the conflict in the nation’s courts and on university campuses, readers of these 1978 Bampton lectures by Englishman A. R. Peacocke will be grateful for being quickly led past both battlefield and no-man’s-land into a powerfully conceived and immensely interesting exploration of the meaning of twentieth century natural science for Christian theology. It is time, Peacocke argues and then demonstrates, for the hostilities to cease; a new era of truly promising dialogue is before us.

Peacocke is well qualified to initiate this dialogue. A physical biochemist who is also a theologian, he is at home with highly complex theories of both natural and religious science. His clear expositions of the views of astro- and nuclear physics, molecular, evolutionary and sociobiology, on the one hand, and biblical, process, and Teilhardian strains of contemporary theology, on the other, will by themselves facilitate mutual understanding. His synthesis of insights drawn from both disciplines also establishes new ground between them, however, and moves the discussion forward.

Central to Peacocke’s work here is his insistence that from a socio-anthropological viewpoint, science and religion share in a common quest for the intelligibility, explanation and meaning of the universe. Discoveries since 1900 have drastically altered the scientists’ view of the world. Questions concerning the human relationship to the world are thus now raised which cannot be answered from within the natural sciences alone: What are the consequences for the meaning of personal life, Peacocke asks, of our knowledge of nature as an immensely complex reality consisting of a hierarchy of interrelated but irreducible levels of organization ranging from the sub-atomic, micro-world, through the macro-world of the biosphere which we inhabit and which is available to our unaided senses, to the mega-world of inter-galactic space? The universe exhibits an indeterminate interplay of chance and uniformity; it appears to be a dynamic process open to the future. While mysteriously fitting a seemingly impenetrable infinite complexity within a finite domain, it renders itself cognizable in the human mind. What is the meaning of the fact that human being, conscious and self-conscious, has emerged within such a universe? Peacocke proposes that this “appetite for intelligibility and meaning” is one which the Judeo-Christian understanding of God as Creator goes a long way toward satisfying.

Peacocke’s treatment of these questions is organized around three central aspects of the scientific world view which are particularly pregnant with theological significance. The first of these aspects concerns the problem of the origin of living molecule systems within an inorganic universe. Citing the research of M. Eigen, Peacocke argues the validity of the view that such systems are the evolutionary product of the interplay between chance and law—i.e., of “random time-dependent processes in a framework of law-like determined properties.” Theologically, the existence of such interplay suggests to Peacocke the appropriateness of a model of God as a
gratuitous and playful creator who delights in the whole of creation. A universe so constituted is
the unceasing “expression of the overflow of the divine generosity.”

The second aspect concerns the present discussion of the old problem of the relation of
the mind and the body. Here Peacocke suggests that the observation of series of levels of
organization of matter within the living world provides warrant for the view that mental activity
is “a non-reducible emergent in a certain specific kind of complex, physico-chemical, neuro-
physiological organism, the brain-in-the-body.” This view, Peacocke argues, represents a non-
dualist model of human consciousness as “transcendence-in-immanence”—a model of enormous
theological import. When this model replaces the dualist one in the analogy of God’s relation to
the world in terms of the mind-body relation, two significant things happen. First, in place of the
traditional emphasis on the externality to nature of God’s agency in creation, the biological
model evokes the female aspect of divine creation: “It is an analogy of God creating the world
within herself.” And secondly, the analogy opens up the possibility of appropriating more fully
than heretofore the biblical notion of the communicating selfhood of the divine word within the
divine being. “The transcendent creator, immanent in the physical nexus which is his self-
expression” makes known his meanings “to those forms of existence which, in time, emerge with
the capacity to discern them.”

Thus the stage is set for consideration of the third aspect, a consideration of human being
as evolved. Here Peacocke deals with the problems of socio-biology in a way which Feuerbach
would admire. The evolutionary process itself confers upon the human being certain needs, the
biological, of course, but also the need to come to terms with one’s own death; to cope with
one’s finitude; to learn how to bear suffering; and to realize one’s potentialities and to steer a
path through life. This list of needs constitutes for Peacocke the agenda for an extended
discussion of the meaning of human life which amounts to a provocative exploration of the grand
themes of Christian theology—the doctrines of the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Atonement.
Topics related to sanctification and eschatology are subsequently developed in the context of
ecological concerns and the question of earth’s future.

This book deserves and will withstand the critical attention of both natural and
theological scientists. It suggests the real possibility of successfully fusing the main liberal
theological traditions of the modern period, represented today by process, Teilhardian and
continental theology. And it invites the welcome conviction that

scientists are, after all, faithful children of God, along with all the rest of us.

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Scholarly integrity and a fine grasp of St. Paul’s argumentative structures, some of which
persist in taxing the resources of the most perceptive commentators, are among the numerous
merits of this pilot volume of the Augsburg Commentary Series.
To comment honestly on a document that has monitored much of the theological rhetoric in the tradition of the Reformation is no small challenge for a Lutheran, but Harrisville accepts the assignment with aplomb and his careful application of hermeneutical detergent leaves the Apostle’s bravura piece with a fresh look.

No Paul of the what-a-poor-worm-am-I variety emerges from this exposition. As a pre-Christ man Paul had pride in the job. No introspective conscience imperilled his confidence in meeting Yahweh’s expectations. The man who dropped blind on Damascus Road was a zealot (107)!

Anxious to escape the Scylla of Antinomianism, preachers and expositors have been known to equate Paul’s teaching about the new life in the Spirit as conformity to a revised Torah. The label for this doctrinal hybrid is “Third Use of the Law.” But whatever the name, from Harrisville’s point of view the interpretation is bad news, and he has hard-core Reformation theology on his side: Lex semper accusat, “Law always accuses.” Well aware that the odds are heavily weighted in favor of catechetical tradition, Harrisville does what he can to flesh out the errors of pietism related to a moralistic interpretation of the Christ-event. With consummate clarity he shows that a distortion of Paul’s teaching concerning the role of the Spirit in determination of the new life strikes at the very heart of the Apostle’s Christology. If this commentary helps clean up Lutheranism’s act on this score alone, the entire series is worth far more than the cost of production.

To an apostle who asked, “Does God care for oxen?” (1 Corinthians 9:9) no cows are sacred, not even the one destined for the altar entitled “Orders of Creation.” Not prone to expository bureaucratese or teeter-totter hermeneutic, Harrisville has this to say at one point in his explanation of Romans 13:1-7: “So there is no principle enunciated here, no high-flown notion of the ‘orders of creation,’ no ‘Christological’ grounding of the state—just simple, homespun, garden-variety, practical wisdom” (204). This quotation is at the same time an exemplar of the type of communication that pervades the exposition.

Unfortunately the clarity of such prose suffers some diminution from moments of rhapsodical rhetoric. For example, in his concluding remarks on the subject of obedience to authority (Romans 13:1-7) Harrisville says something about contemporary involvement in political processes that are foreign to Paul’s experience, but in my judgment he obfuscates the main point, that our unique constitutional privileges call into question the frequent use of Romans 13:1-7 as a cover for quietism in the face of social and economic injustices. Indeed, in the context Harrisville’s reference to Nero as a “butcher,” albeit in rhetorical ploy (205), is inappropriate. The fact is that Nero was a people-person and a “New Dealer,” to use a modern scholar’s comparison of Nero with Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Long after Nero’s death people kept putting flowers on his memorial, and his return was anticipated in the East. Scarcely the picture of a hated butcher! That cartoon comes from the aristocracy, which despised his guts.

That Harrisville knows well the topography of past exposition of the Epistle is beyond question. He sorts the best and where explanation has been deficient or gone awry he gives the reader fresh opportunity for understanding. At some points, however, he might have exercised less restraint in broadening his readers’ impressions of Paul’s social-economic-political-religious context. To cite but one instance: the exposition of humanity sunk in idolatrous abominations (Romans 1:21-23). First of all, it would be helpful to the
non-professional reader for whom this commentary is also designed to know that Roman citizens in general would have shared Paul’s abhorrence concerning animal likenesses of deities: they ridiculed the Egyptians for such absurd religious expression. Second, the reader of the commentary is entitled to know that it was customary in the Graeco-Roman world to erect statues in honor of those who were responsible especially for mighty acts of deliverance. Now, if anyone deserves expressions of appreciation (see Romans 1:21) it is God, but instead of offering him an appropriate response, namely the “spiritual worship” described in Romans 12:1, humanity tends to engage in the cult of created things. In brief, the statues aggrandize the creation and ultimately their designers rather than the Creator.

At this point in the commentary it would have been helpful had Harrisville also given some indication as to the nature of the idols in our own religious settings. Such comment would permit the text to experience a fresh language event and so disclose its meaning for readers who know of no Egyptians who do the things described in Romans 1:23.

Quite frequently a number of claims made by advertisers of products require a high rate of discount. Such is not the case with this commentary. The Foreword says it is written for “laypeople, students, and pastors,” and it is. The claim is made that the volume is designed to “enhance its usefulness;” the truth is that one can read this book in long stretches or readily find a small section of comment, such is the clarity of styling and the variety of type face. When required for comment, the Revised Standard Version appears in bold face, but the purchaser does not pay the equivalent of approximately 30 extra pages, which would be the case had the publisher included the full text of Romans. At points Harrisville does not hesitate to call into question and improve a rendering of the RSV.

After all is said someone may ask, “Is this commentary series really necessary?” Were it designed to be a propaganda medium for sectarian positions the answer would have to be a resounding “NO.” Yet precisely because the Bible has experienced misadventure in Lutheran circles, a commentary of this kind is needed. The editors are responsible theologians, with international reputations. And this first volume declares that integrity will be one of many laudable features in this series.

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Ministry in America is the report and analysis of an in-depth survey of the clergy and laity of forty-seven North American denominations about their expectations of a beginning minister. The survey was undertaken by the Association of Theological Schools in connection with the Readiness for Ministry Project. Its subject, what North American Christians expect of ministers in terms of their skills and qualities, is an important issue. This book is no less important.

The text really combines two volumes in one. The initial portion provides statistical results of the survey. Guidance in deciphering the data is provided by the editors and two other
sociologists. These chapters and the book’s final section offer both a description of how the survey was conducted and a descriptive analysis of the results. Some analysis of the differences the survey reveals between denominations in their expectations of the ministry is offered. The discussion is difficult going for the non-specialists (pastor, theologian, etc.), but at least the initial chapters must be considered by readers in order to discipline themselves to take the results seriously. The second portion of the book will probably be of most interest to readers of this journal. The results for each denomination are considered separately. Eighteen theologians, representing thirteen denominational families, reflect on the meaning of the results for their denomination. Questions about how well the results reflect a denomination’s historic understanding of the ministry and the implications of this for the denomination’s future are considered.

The book is complex, yet rich in its insights and the challenges it poses for the Church on our continent. It might be read with any one of at least four purposes in view. Laity will find the text useful in clarifying their own expectations of ministers. Pastors should read it in order better to understand expectations of their office. It should be honestly studied and discussed by seminary faculties and administrators as a guide for clarifying how better to prepare students for ministry in the final decades of our century. (This use is especially appropriate since seminaries were the original audience for which the survey was intended.) Finally, the book will be of interest to those who wish to learn more about the theology of the different North American denominations. The results of the survey show some disagreement among denominations in their view of the ministry. It is intriguing that these differences seem to reflect the underlying theological disagreements among the denominations. The editors themselves call our attention to the way in which the survey confirms that theology shapes practice (xx; 87-88).

The cumulative results of all denominations combined do indicate a high degree of agreement about the ministry among North American Christians (51-52). The highest ranking expectations pertain not so much to pastoral skills as to qualities of the minister’s person (31-32). However, other expectations are so varied (counseling, theological, administrative skills, personal piety, etc.) that pastors can only be competent to the degree they become generalists, Renaissance people (50). Finally, a disturbing parochialism also seems to characterize North American Christianity. The results suggest that laity will only tolerate the clergy’s involvement in extra-congregational activities if there is time (74). These data pose challenges for theological education. Faculty must grapple with the fact that the laity’s priorities for ministry are not the same as their own, and learn to articulate the Gospel in a way that takes this into account. Hard questions will need to be raised about the role seminaries should play in the personal and spiritual formation of their students. Also, the varied and apparently conflicting expectations placed on ministers suggest that a systematic approach to theology, which does not allow for a variety of theological images each to be used in appropriate context, is not a valid tool for ministry. Serious consideration of the data seems to imply that ministry in contemporary America requires a contextual theological perspective which is flexible enough to embrace a variety of theological models and provides guidance in regards to what images/models are appropriate for a given ministry situation.

Lutheran readers will inevitably gravitate to the book’s thirteenth chapter, where the data of Lutheran respondents to the survey (LCA, ALC, LCMS combined) are analyzed. George
Lindbeck, the eminent ecumenist of Yale University, wrote this chapter. It is by far the most splendid piece of analysis in the volume.

There are some disturbing features in the survey results. Lutherans hold the importance of knowledge of their Confessional documents in no higher esteem than many other denominations. Indeed Presbyterians give this item the highest rating (78-79; 157). Lutheran laity think preaching is more important than Lutheran clergy do (103). And interestingly enough, Lutherans are as attracted as Baptists are to a law-oriented approach to ethics (79; 147). Christian education still needs to be a high priority for Lutherans.

Lindbeck’s analysis, though, is first concerned with the relationship between Lutheran survey results and those of other denominations. He notes the “eccentric” character of Lutheran expectations. Lutheran responses seem to embody a “conservative evangelicalism” (429). Lutherans resemble most evangelical Protestant denominations with their stress on preaching and Christ-centeredness, yet they disagree with the Evangelical stress on assertive evangelism and Biblicism. Rather, Lutheran responses are more typically Catholic with their emphasis on the sacramental and liturgical dimensions of ministry (414; 422-423).

Lindbeck argues that this eccentricity, which is a function of Lutheranism’s historic roots, gives it a certain lack of flexibility which is a present handicap for evangelism. Yet this characteristic gives Lutheranism a strategic role in facilitating ecumenical dialogue. It bridges Protestantism and Catholicism. While other denominations have largely forfeited a unique identity, Lutherans will be able to capitalize on movements toward Protestant-Catholic rapprochement (436-437). Such rapprochement would be an affirmation of Lutheran identity, of its evangelical catholicism. Thus it is in Lutheranism’s interests to facilitate this kind of ecumenical movement. To the degree that it does happen Lutheranism stands to gain. If Lutherans maintain their present situation and seek to repristinate the past, the Lutheran eccentricity will impede growth, thereby endangering the unique Lutheran witness to justification by faith (439-440). Thus the results of the survey, Lindbeck argues, seem to imply that Lutheranism’s best course of action to preserve its unique witness is to move towards rapprochement with Catholicism. Unlike movement towards Evangelicalism this policy would allow Lutherans to recover the Reformers’ original self-understanding (442). The data provided by this survey will certainly give much food for thought to those who are suspicious of ecumenical efforts compromising Lutheran identity.

The survey results reveal at least one other interesting insight. Lutherans deem a minister’s personal virtue less important than most denominations (427, 421). Lindbeck argues that this reflects the Confessions’ commitment to viewing Christian life in terms of forgiveness rather than perfection (425-426). As with many other denominational results the data presented in this book certainly confirm that theology can play an important role in shaping attitudes and piety in the Christian community. It is worth reading the book just to have the importance of theology for ministry confirmed anew for the reader. Read the book, and reflect on the other intriguing issues it raises.

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These two texts are in part answers to the same question: of what use is philosophy to biblical interpretation? They both envision some use for philosophy though their answers, in many manners, are very different. I will summarize first how their answers are similar, and then how they differ.

Similarities

Both agree that “fundamentalism does not do justice to the actual phenomena of the biblical writings” (Hamann, 28). Hamann describes his position as the middle ground between fundamentalism and philosophy, though he admits it is far closer to fundamentalism. He differentiates his position from fundamentalism in three ways. He understands all biblical propositions not to be of equal value but always related to the central message of Scripture, the Gospel. Second, Hamann maintains that the Gospel becomes a negative norm: Scripture cannot teach anything counter to its central proclamation. Finally, in accord with fundamentalists, Hamann asserts, “inerrancy cannot be proved...” since “it is a matter of faith...,” but he disagrees with fundamentalists by claiming that “logically speaking, inerrancy could be disproved if assertion after assertion in the Scriptures could be shown to be mistaken and false” (67).

For his part, Thiselton rejects any theological argument that attempts to render hermeneutics unnecessary. He argues that “appeals to the Holy Spirit do not bypass hermeneutics...for the Spirit works through human understanding, and not independently of it” (440).

For both writers philosophy has an instrumental role in biblical interpretation. Hamann finds two uses for philosophy. First, since the Word of God is written, and spoken in the logic of human language it is necessary to use human reason and logic to comprehend “all the various kinds of literary forms made use of in the Bible” (71). Second, because human reason can only show us our ignorance, philosophy can be the praeparatio evangelii to show us that “we need a revelation from God” (72).

Thiselton indicates three uses of philosophical description for the New Testament interpreter. It can (1) define the nature of the hermeneutical task, (2) provide conceptual tools for the interpretation of parts of the text, and (3) help the interpreter to detect his own presuppositions and enlarge his own critical capacities.

Differences

The differences are substantial. Hamann’s text is a slightly edited version of the Thomas F. Staley Foundation lectures delivered at Valparaiso University. The popular style is clearly directed to an undergraduate audience. This style, on its own, would commend the text for
certain settings: for example, parish adult education programs. However, the text is marred by unnecessary exaggeration, inaccuracy and less than careful use of definitions. For example, philosophy is defined in chapter two as “the setting of human reason, of personal and subjective factors, in opposition to the claim to speak with divine authority which the Bible makes for itself” (32). Yet, in chapter three philosophy is said to be necessary for understanding the logic and literary form of the biblical text. Apparently the definition of philosophy has changed! I cannot imagine that the first polemical definition was or should have been readily received as a fair or useful tool for understanding the role of philosophy in biblical interpretation. In short, the argument is won (sic) in the setting of the terms. Furthermore, Professor Hamann uses interchangeably key theological terms like “infallibility” and “inerrancy” of Scripture when several of his sources use them in two different manners. Normally “infallibility” refers to the a priori and de jure absence of error in contrast to “inerrancy” which refers to the a posteriori and de facto reliability of a proposition (cf. Avery Dulles, “Infallibility: The Terminology,” in Teaching Authority & Infallibility in the Church: Lutherans and, Catholics in Dialogue VI, ed. Paul C. Empie, T. Austin Murphy and Joseph A. Burgess [Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1978], 73). By means of a polemical and sloppy arrangement of the issues, Hamann does a disservice to his readers. For the next effect of the text is to foreclose discussion. Many of his points otherwise might be well taken and far more persuasive if they were set out in a different manner.

Thiselton’s text is a substantial piece of scholarship addressing several major figures in recent philosophical hermeneutics: Heidegger, Bultmann, Gadamer and Wittgenstein. The work is encyclopedic in its scope and deserves John Macquarrie’s description of it as “the most comprehensive discussion of the hermeneutical question that I have ever read” (jacket cover). In two introductory chapters the author admirably describes the nature and scope of the questions relating to hermeneutics. He characterizes two major horizons involved in all hermeneutical discussion, the text and the interpreter, and broadens the implications of pre-understanding well beyond the boundaries sketched by Bultmann. His discussion of historical relativity and distance is judicious in its criticism of such figures as D. E. Nineham and probative in its positive valuation of W. Pannenberg on these issues. Finally, in these opening chapters, he outlines the importance of the relationship between language and thought by arguing that language-uses, as language habits, influence thought.

His criticism of Martin Heidegger, Rudolf Bultmann, and Hans-Georg Gadamer, unlike Hamann’s, sets aside several false, but generally held, characterizations of the first two figures. He rightly rejects the notion that Heidegger was an existentialist philosopher, a false description which Hamann parrots. Thiselton clarifies the sources of Bultmann’s hermeneutical program, accurately downplays the role and significance of Heidegger and Collingwood, and thus avoids another pitfall Hamann takes. Thiselton stresses the importance of Herrmann, nineteenth century liberalism, Neo-Kantian philosophy, and dialectical theology as the foundations of Bultmann’s hermeneutical program, all of which preceded Bultmann’s encounter in any significant manner with Heidegger. I would only add the importance of Lutheran pietism to Thiselton’s list of Bultmannian influences that antedate Heidegger’s influence. Thiselton critiques Heidegger’s emphasis on world-hood to the exclusion of subject-object thinking, or critical reflection, in the hermeneutical experience. However, in his critique of Gadamer, he transposes too much of this failing in Heidegger onto Gadamer’s concept of the fusion of horizons. The possibility for the historical and linguistic distanciation of the text in Gadamer’s
thought is far more prevalent than Thiselton suggests.

Thiselton continues his previous contribution and provides his most helpful insights to the analysis of semantics and grammar in the New Testament by using Wittgensteinian classes of grammar. For example, he notes how the “showing” in the parables of Jesus and “argument” in the epistles of Paul are “two modes of discourse” quite related to one another. “Picture and linguistics recommendations,” he argues, “profoundly affect how we see the world and order our lives” (444). Recent interpretation dependent upon a linguistic paradigm, whether Wittgensteinian or Heideggerian, has borne out this important contribution to biblical interpretation. By way of example, Thiselton’s analysis of polymorphous concepts such as “faith” in the New Testament is used to illustrate the value of such linguistic analysis. The traditional concept of *simul justus et peccator* is shown not to be contradictory assertions, but two evaluations made from within different language-games. Thiselton’s arguments here are clear and suggestive of further analysis of such polymorphous concepts.

The book suffers from secondary drawbacks. Most of the text is an exposition of secondary rather than primary texts. The text could be streamlined, and the flow of the argument made clearer. As it stands, it is easy to lose one’s way in the argument because of the barrage of encyclopedic details and notes. Side references to secondary figures on certain topics exacerbate the loss of the argument’s flow. For example, the work of Paul Ricoeur and Bernard Lonergan is tangentially mentioned in relationship to two topics. However, when topics directly related to their major intellectual contributions are discussed, neither Lonergan on the role of insight in human understanding (388) nor Ricoeur on a critical moment in the interpretive process in Thiselton’s critique of Heidegger (187ff) appears. The cluttered use of the names of secondary sources in the text itself gives the impression of name-dropping in lieu of argument.

Though Thiselton writes of the importance of the pre-understanding of the interpreter in the interpretive process, he does not fully develop this concept in his practical interpretation of the New Testament. Instead, his practical use of philosophical description addresses primarily semantic and grammatical considerations. As a result of this limited use of philosophical description, his suggestion that the thesis might have implications for the relationship between exegesis and theology does not achieve the fullest possible concrete expression in his examples. One major topic in contemporary hermeneutical discussion is deliberately omitted by Thiselton: the discussion of the relationship between language and reality. This omission when joined with his failure to develop the full range of implications of Heideggerian pre-understanding represents a substantial area of research in the contemporary discussion undeveloped in this book. The failure correlates with Thiselton’s facile equation of Gadamer’s “language as tradition” in *Truth and Method* with “language-uses” in Wittgenstein. This doubtful equation would be a most appropriate place to continue the discussion so ably engendered by this book.

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Both of the books under review are discussions of the subject of social justice from a conservative evangelical perspective. Both are popular accounts, not scholarly investigations. Neither turns up any new ground on the subject of justice; they are introductions to the subject and rudimentary in scope. Richard Mouw attempts to address his work to a wide audience of Christian laity (“the average church member”); Waldron Scott’s book is directed more or less exclusively to conservative evangelicals.

Mouw comes at the issue of social justice from the perspective of the theology of the laity. He is attempting to move the discussion of such theology “beyond

Mouw is concerned with a phenomenon which he calls “ecclesiasticism,” which he defines as an overrating of the clergy and of the institutional church; however he manages to surface this concern in a generally positive way, without descending into anti-clericalism or anti-institutional polemics.

Although Mouw does not quote him on this score, it seems to this reviewer that Mouw’s concern has been succinctly summarized by Gustavo Gutierrez in his book, *A Theology of Liberation*: “It is necessary to build a ‘profane Christendom,’ in other words, a society inspired by Christian principles...the special task of the layman will be to create this new Christendom in the temporal sphere” (55-56). This is surely a noble project and one that the theologians of liberation have done much to advance, but as I read Mouw’s book I wondered if his whole premise might not be slightly off base. He seems to think that too much of our creative theological energy is directed to “churchy” theology and that a reorientation toward the concerns of the worldly or secular Christian are needed. But could one not raise the possibility that precisely the opposite is the case? I suspect that one could make a good argument for the thesis that most of the truly exciting and influential theology since the time of Søren Kierkegaard has been a theology for secular Christians. The works of such modern giants as Paul Tillich, Rudolph Bultmann and Reinhold Niebuhr are notable for their distinct lack of interest in the institutional church and their assumption of the irrelevance of much if not most of what clergy spend their time doing. Morale among the clergy today is notoriously low. Perhaps more than a theology of holy worldliness—a theology showing laity their relevance to God’s work in the twentieth
century—what we really need is a theology that could show clergy and the institutionalized, church laity that they still have some relevance; or better, perhaps we need some theological blueprints to help the institutional church regain a place in the dynamic avant-garde that is the one, holy, catholic and apostolic church.

Tongue-in-cheek observations aside, one can recommend Called to Holy Worldliness, especially for use in adult discussion groups. It is a well written and well argued introduction both to the need for a larger role for the laity in the church and the need for the church to become more committed to social justice.

Waldron Scott comes at the issue of social justice from the perspective of the theology of missions. This is a deeply committed author, but his book will not be of great interest or use to a Lutheran audience. (Indeed, it will not be very useful to any Christians belonging to “mainstream” denominationalism.) This is not necessarily bad as the book is clearly not written with Lutherans in mind. The purpose of the work is to address conservative evangelicals and to persuade them that a commitment to social justice is an intrinsic part of their mission in the world. One wishes Scott luck. In a time of growing right wing sentiment among evangelicals, and with the “Moral Majority” scoring triumphs in the minds and hearts of conservative Christians, Lutherans can only hope that Bring Forth Justice might prove something of an antidote, however we might haggle with Scott’s theological method.

But haggle we must. Lutherans will be extremely frustrated by a number of attitudes and tendencies prominent in this book. First and foremost is the way Holy Scripture and early church history are handled. The attitude to Scripture is, to put it mildly, pre-critical. His handling of Scripture is schematic, uncritical and totally unaware of the plurality of theological perspectives within the Bible. This reviewer found himself agreeing with many of Scott’s conclusions, while finding his scriptural arguments completely unper-

suasive. This all came to a head in chapter six, in which Scott dealt with mission in the early church via a literalistic and schematic rendering of the Book of Acts. Scott’s dubious biblical interpretations were not enhanced, furthermore, by the inclusion of silly diagrams reminiscent of the ones in Kurth’s Catechetical Helps. Surely even conservative evangelicals can read prose without the help of such fatuous aids.

The prose itself was not elegantly written and tended to be cute. I found myself being irritated by a literary style that must call the author of the third Gospel “Dr. Luke.” When the style was not cute, it often tended to be pretentious. One should avoid saying things like, “My wife Joan and I incarnated ourselves and our family in Zahlen, a marketing center servicing the Baqaa Valley of Lebanon” (178). In general, the prose was slow-paced and repetitive. In addition, the book expounds the history of missions and its relation to social justice for nearly three hundred pages and yet does not significantly discuss the need for dialogue between Christianity and the other great world religions.

Despite all its flaws, I’m glad that Scott has written this book. Bring Forth Justice demonstrates that there is a theme in Scripture that is so clear and decisive that it cannot be missed, regardless of which method of biblical interpretation you adopt: the Christian Bible requires justice. It makes little difference whether you are a fundamentalist reading the Bible literally or a full-blown historical critic or even an exponent of structuralism; if you read Holy
Scripture honestly and sincerely, you will find a just God calling for lives dedicated to justice for the poor and oppressed.

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Certain stereotypes of first century Jewish history die hard. The neat dichotomy between what is “Jewish” or “Hebrew” and what is “Hellenistic” has served the theological interests of modern orthodox Christianity and Judaism so well that it will no doubt persist as an irresistible half-truth although it probably has misled as often as it has enlightened. A well established “Normative Judaism” from the time of Ezra and throughout the New Testament era has not only been a firm claim of Rabbinic Judaism at least since the era of the Mishnah (c. 200 C.E.) but the concept has also provided a ready foil by which students of the New Testament and Christian origins could define “Normative Christianity,” i.e., at the expense of a caricature of Judaism. The view of Galilee as a region whose half-Jewish identity reflected alienation from the temple and Jewish leadership in Jerusalem has also been regarded as consistent with its reputation for producing revolutionary prophets and for ready attraction to Christian preaching.

The attack on such conventional views or stereotypes is currently intense, as all three of these volumes indicate. It is not merely a skirmish, for the ranks of such studies have been growing rapidly over the past two decades with no remission in sight. Indeed, the awesome battery of Jewish, Christian, and secular research scholarship and arsenal of literary, archeological, and socio-historical evidence that have been assembled so far indicate that nothing less than a revolution of understanding of the era of the origins of Judaism and Christianity is at hand.

Martin Hengel, historian, exegete, and theologian, has certainly been in the vanguard of this scholarship. His two volume work, Judaism and Hellenism (ET 1974) is already a classic. Jews, Greeks and Barbarians “is a substantially enlarged version of two articles which will appear in English in the Cambridge History of Judaism” (ix). It is a scholarly and closely documented depiction of the political and social history of Palestine and of the “Hellenization” of Judaism in Palestine and in the Diaspora down to the Maccabean period. It
is a volume for those who have some independent prior knowledge of the history and literature of that century and a half which extends from Alexander the Great to Antiochus IV “Epiphanes.” It provides a fascinating and detailed glimpse of the ways the nation and people of Palestine struggled to come to terms with the dominant culture of the Hellenistic successors of Alexander who ruled from Egypt (323-200 B.C.E.) and from Syria (200-168 B.C.E.). Most intriguing is the further specification of Tcherikover’s insight that in the early phases, “Hellenization” was an act of upward social and economic mobility, pursued actively by conquered semitic and Egyptian peoples. Hengel cautions against the notion that it was an active policy of campaign pursued by the Ptolemies or Seleucids. The concept of the “Hellenization of barbarians,” i.e., meaning the indigenous peoples, “only became a general theme in the time of the Romans” (see pp. 54, 63, 74-75). The updating or “Hellenizing” of the Jewish scriptures, therefore, reflects a self-conscious Jewish adaptation of the tradition which, in turn, provokes as stern an anti-Hellenistic response from other Jews (97). The Maccabean polemic against the “barbarians,” i.e., the Jewish Hellenists and their Syrian Greek accomplices displays the claim of a newly established and self-conscious Judaism to its election by God out of all the nations of the world by reversing the usual use of the word “barbarians” as referring to those who have not attained proficiency in Greek (see pp. 77-78). Thus a century before the Roman era began and almost two centuries before Jesus’ crucifixion by Pilate and the beginnings of the Christian mission in the Empire, Israel has already endured a long internal debate and struggle concerning competitive notions of its identity with respect to the dominant culture. Hengel has struck another severe blow against any simple notion of what was “Jewish” and what was “Hellenistic.”

Sean Freyne builds heavily yet independently upon Hengel’s research. Freyne’s detailed investigation on Galilee will certainly tell most readers far more about the geography, history, culture, economy, politics and religion of the region than they would have thought they cared to know. But again, when so many undocumented assertions are made, especially by commentators on the gospels, authors of “Lives” of Jesus, and early church historians, about the distinctive character of Galilee, nothing but meticulous historical research can sort out the non-sense and half-truth. The problem is no less severe in Jewish historiography based on Rabbinic sources where the prejudice against Galilee is much more obvious than is the historical basis for such disdain.

Freyne traces down several of the traditional verdicts on Galilee (e.g., that the Hasmoneans forcibly converted Galilee and compelled circumcision, producing a weak Jewish identity), and he challenges such views with extensive discussion of the evidence (e.g., the Idumeans were the objects of such efforts, but much of Galilee was already securely Jewish and continued on the periphery of Jerusalem disputes while accommodating its Jewish heritage to the hellenism and gentile presence in the region during both the Greek-Hasmonean and the Roman-Herodian eras). If one wants to challenge Freyne’s reading of the evidence, and many will, it is readily assembled in his book. One of his observations that is sure to attract such scrutiny is his contention that those Galilean “prophets” and “revolutionaries” so frequently mentioned as evidence of a “revolutionary ethos” or even a separatism from Jerusalem have been badly misrepresented. He argues that generally they turn out to have been extremely concerned about the Jewish temple and that affairs in Jerusalem prove focal to their “zealous” fervor and action. The rural folk from Idumea and Galilee apparently felt more attached to the temple than had been imagined. However “hellenized” these regions had become, their “Jewish” partisanship had not been diminished. The struggle “for the soul of Judaism” (324) that ensued with the destruction
of Jerusalem proceeded unevenly in Galilee with the rabbis expressing dismay at a new class of non-peasant land owners being settled in Galilee and with the persistence of the appeal of the hasid or holy man as an alternative to Pharisaism. But the Jewish identity of these several Galilean traditions (including the followers of Jesus) must not be obscured by the polemics between the groups.

Michael Stone’s little volume offers a handy and readable survey of such recent research, highlighting the historical issues that have emerged in both popular and scholarly interpretation. The subjects he discusses at first seem arbitrarily chosen, but the reader is steadily introduced to the diversity of Jewish religious expression (cf. p. 58: “perhaps three varieties from Judaism have survived. These are rabbinic Judaism, Christianity and perhaps Samaritanism”), the penetration of Jewish (i.e., Judean) Palestine by Greek language and culture, and the rich field of non-canonical Jewish literature of the era of the second temple (Ezra to the Jewish revolt, 536 B.C.E. to 70 C.E.). Stone practices the historian’s peculiar craft, but he also ventures to discuss the significance of this research for biblical exegesis (see pp. 53-56). Thus the reader who will next want to move into a more thorough discussion of the literature (see George W. E. Nickelsburg, *Jewish Literature Between the Bible and the Mishnah*, due to be reviewed in *Word & World*) will find Scriptures, Sects and Visions to have been an excellent historical introduction.

More is at stake in this historical research than merely the slaying of the dragons of historical stereotypes. Interpreters of the scriptures can not afford to be careless about these historical issues for the technical research and discussion has begun to expose the misrepresentation and anti-semitism that has been implicit and often explicit in much western Christian New Testament interpretation. Furthermore, the lively human situations and urgent questions of faith which the early Christian scriptures addressed were wrought of the metal of this era of Jewish history under the dominion of the Greco-Roman empires. Volumes such as these not only serve to correct misrepresentations but to put flesh and sinew on the bones of Christian origins within Jewish history.

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**WHAT ARE THEY SAYING ABOUT CREATION?,** by Zachary Hayes. Ramsey, NJ: Paulist Press, 1980. Pp. 120. $2.95 (paper).

The doctrine of creation poses questions about the relation between science and theology. Zachary Hayes, professor of theology at Catholic Theological Union in Chicago, says, “Whereas our familiar theology, following Parmenides and Aristotle, placed primary emphasis on stability and situated change within a metaphysics of being, the modern experience is more akin to
Heraclitus, placing primary emphasis on change and treating stability within a metaphysics of becoming” (11).

The result has been open warfare between science and theology from Copernicus to Darwin. Concordism tries to resolve the conflict by re-interpreting Genesis to fit geological evidence. Fundamentalism simply denies the truth of science. Pluralism affirms two truths, one for science and another for theology. Recognizing the autonomy of both Hayes says we should not expect science to prove faith claims nor should we expect theology to prove the claims of science. “But religion must express itself in terms relevant to its cultural context” (16).

Hayes thinks this can be done by a proper reading of Scripture. Thus the Old Testament story of creation must be read as a religious confession, not a cosmology. God creates in order to have a covenant. In the New Testament creation is seen as the initiation of God’s redemptive involvement with the world and its history. Today, as in the 13th century when Thomas Aquinas achieved his mighty synthesis with Aristotle, attempts are being made for a new synthesis. The problem is to appropriate a modern Heraclitean world-experience, just as Thomas had to appropriate an ancient Parmenidean world-experience.

Thus J. B. Cobb is working with the process philosophy of Whitehead and Hartshorne. P. Schoonenberg and A. Hulsbosch are engaged with the genetic philosophy of Teilhard de Chardin. Karl Rahner is trying to do this with Hegel and German Idealism. R. Pendergast weaves together Rahner, Whitehead, and Teilhard. The objection to all these attempts is that they embrace metaphysics which are not verified by science. Even if it were possible to tie theology to a scientific world-view, that view would be constantly changing, as is the way with science.

The problems of evolution, polygenism, and original sin are discussed with a careful exegesis of Genesis 2-3 and Romans 5:12-19. The hermeneutical key is to read Scripture as an aetiological narrative rather than literal history. Rahner wants to root the narrative in history; Hulsbosch is content with mere aetiology; Ricoeur sees the Bible as mythical symbolism. In all three, however, the concrete image of the biological origin of the human race is of less significance than the universal condition of whatever the stories are talking about, whether it is human origins or the fall into sin. The question of origins is, therefore, resolved by saying that God creates through evolution. This rather nicely refutes Deism because it allows for God to be active in history. The question of monogenism versus polygenism is resolved because Genesis is not taken as history. Both Genesis and Romans seem to require monogenism, but this is so only if we read them literally. The unicity of the sinful couple in the Genesis story does not require monogenism if we read the story as a description of the way evil spreads from willful rebellion. Also Paul uses Adam as a type to be contrasted with Christ, not as an individual historical person. Paul is not talking about a concrete individual causing sin for the human race. He is rather af-

firming the solidarity of sin in the race, with Adam being the type for this condition.

Finally Hayes speaks about the future of creation. And again he reads eschatology not in terms of apocalyptic, literal details, but in terms of the prospect for the fulfillment of grace. Rather than Christ being at the end of time or in the middle, perhaps he is close to the beginning of human history. The goal of history is not the mere fact of life but the increasing quality of life, which leads to an ever growing universe.
The ordination of women has been debated in American churches for well over a century. For many people the question has been resolved either by a denominational decision to ordain women or by a continued refusal to give women’s ordination serious consideration. But Jewett asserts that “the question of female ordination...is a nuance of the larger question of female subordination” (20). Thus, the formal admission of women into the ministerial office is inadequate unless attention is also given to the aspects of Christianity which subjugate all women. This volume is directed primarily to “evangelicals” who oppose ordination of women. In addition, the position of church people who view the ordination of women as evidence of the end of subordination of women in and by the church is called into question.

The ideal of partnership between the sexes, as developed in the author’s *Man as Male and Female: A Study of Sexual Relationships From a Theological Point of View* (Eerdmans, 1975) is assumed throughout this essay. Partnership based upon mutual creation in God’s image appears repeatedly in refutation of arguments “that women should not be admitted to the order of ministry in the church,” in affirmation of women’s right to ministry, and in discussion of masculine theological language.

Each of the three arguments against women’s ordination—from the nature of woman, from the nature of the office, and from the masculinity of God—is stated and then refuted. Consideration of the arguments from the nature of woman and of the office are disappointingly brief and superficial. The only issue discussed in the former case is exclusion of women on the basis of their erotic sexuality. The significance of erotic sexuality—male or female—in the exercise of the office of ministry is merely hinted at.

The author contends, in the latter case, that all arguments from the nature of the office derive from a presupposition of female inferiority. The effect of various doctrines of ministerial office are judged inconsequential despite historical evidence to the contrary.

The response to the argument from the masculinity of God is both more comprehensive and more useful. Both in the section devoted to the discussion of this issue and in “Epilogue: Theology and the Language of the Masculine” attention is turned to the doctrine of God and language, concerns of both radical and reformist feminist theologians. Jewett’s attempt to free divine imagery and theological language from their patriarchal limitations while retaining the old images and forms is well intended.

He begins by affirming that there is no sexual distinction in God. The fact of masculine imagery, male incarnation and a male apostolate are granted historical and cultural, but not theological, significance. Dangers in literal interpretation of Biblical imagery are discussed pointing to both masculine and feminine examples. New Testament accounts of women’s activities are cited as evidence that the exclusively male apostolate may be superseded; the inclusion of Gentiles in the originally Jewish apostolate is shown to support the inclusion of women.
These insights and good intentions are not carried through. Jewett acknowledges the inadequacy of “generic” usage of masculine language, but surrenders to its “inevitability.” He recognizes the possibility of feminine imagery conveying God’s personal nature, but reverts to the way God has spoken about “himself” in the scriptures. Since God is more often referred to as father than as mother and since God became a man rather than a woman, the author advocates retention of these scriptural usages. Having identified the historical and cultural limitations imposed on a transcendent God by centuries of primarily male speech and theology, he fails to challenge the reader beyond those limits.

Jewett, professor of Systematic Theology at Fuller Theological Seminary, writes to those who oppose ordination of women. That group will find this book challenging. Those who accept female ordination, and are anxious to get back to “business as usual” in the church, will find underlying questions which require their attention: “To admit women to the office of ministry would be,” as Jewett phrases C. S. Lewis’ objection, “to turn Christianity into a different sort of religion” (29). However, those who have begun to struggle with the subjugation of women which results from a masculine doctrine of God and inadequate use of language will find that this volume promises more than it delivers with regard to what different sort of religion Christianity will be now that women are admitted to the office of ministry.

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